Fleet Battle Tactics lectures, 1886 Apr-May

which will be able to maintain their relative speed, and be handled with certainty, in all kinds of weather in which a decisive fleet action is likely or possible to occur; say up to a single or [erased] double reefed topsail breeze, such will undoubtedly be and continue the principal factors in all naval tactics. A large vessel always has had, and always will have, the superiority over numerous small vessels, because the former is power concentrated (in the hands of one man) the latter is power diffused. Near a hostile coast, under favorable circumstances, a large ship may be overwhelmed by an immense presponderance of numbers, just as frigates in rare instances have been beaten down, when becalmed, by a multitude of funboats; or as large corvettes at anchor and carelessly [handled -crossed out] watched have been cut out by a mulititude of armed cutters; but vessels thus taken have usually been paid for more dearly, in lives at least, than when captured in a more usual manner. Still the clouds and swarms of torpedo boats (and torpedo cruisers), as it is common to speak of them must be considered. It will be remembered that we are dealing with deep sea fighting, between fleets that are cut loose from their home ports and harbor resources. HERE I DISCUSS SMALL TORPEDO BOATS [underlined] IN COMPARISON WITH HEAVY [underlined] TORPEDO-RAMS [underlined] The torpedo cruiser, being a sea going vessel, I need not further consider. If not in detail, in general principle, it is the same as the ram I have advocated, possessing very great speed and operat

ing at close quarters. I should fear for it a loss of speed in fresh wind and sea from insufficient bulk. A combination of larger and smaller rams might [underlined] offer equal advantages with increase of economy. (The English "Hecla" - Torpedo depot ship, carries 6 or 8 torpedo boats, in cranes, somewhat similar in manner to the way a Whaler carried her boats. Attached to a fleet the "Hecla" could drop these swift torpedo boats (steam up) as needed. S.B.L.) I labor here under the grave disadvantage of not being acquainted with the details of the methods by which torpedo boats are to be got into the water, nor of knowing what success has attended the practical working of these methods at sea. It seems to me however, that it should not be at all impracticable, nor even very hard, to put these boats into the water in any weather in which they can be usefully handled. I should feel however, very doubtful about getting them out or down successfully in the heat of action, and very particularly doubtful of getting them out quickly enough to seize one of the flitting chances of battle. With favorable weather it seems to me the little brood of torpedo boats must be got out as one of the preparations for action, and it may be remembered[strike out] remarked in passing that the care of them after action may very well hamper a fleet and prevent a victory from being followed up. While the battle rages, the small fry may be left to sink or swim as best they can; but when victory has de-

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cided, the victors cannot leave them to their fate; the vanquished can.

When they are down, what part are they to play? what particular sphere is to be asigned to them? Are they first to open the attack or second to hover on the skirts of the battle watching their chance to pene rate with their small and hardy dimensions; or third when certain results more or less decisive, have obtained, more particularly the crippling of some ships, are they to give the coup de grace? as the French valets used to kill the horseman their master had dismounted.

The torpedo boat must come very near its target. If experience should justify its use in the open sea, ships of all nations will be alike supplied with them. Precisely where they will be placed in the order of battle need not here be discussed; the first question is where, how and with what changes of success they can attack the enemy's line.

In the first place I suppose we may say they will not attack the whole of it, but will concentrate, hoping to reach their aim unhindered by the enemy's boats. So far as opposition by their equl equals, other torpedo boats, the changes are neither worse nor better than in the case of any other equals contending. Compared with the class of large Rams, they are smaller undoubtedly, as targets, and the speed may be considered as the same.

Nevertheless I think, despite their greater numbers, that the

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chances are decidedly against them as compared with the Ram. Though harder to hit, their motive and directing power, i.e. their engines and their captain, are vulnerable to a score of projectiles where the ram is open to one. In addition they are weak in the best means of defense, offensive power. Put aside their torpedo, efficient only in contact, and what have they to use against their gigantic opponents?

The fleet attacked will doubtless be arranged with a view to minimize its openness to attack, and to concentrate its machine guns on the front or flank attacked. Intervals will be closed as much as possible and covered by a second indented line forming narrow cul de sacs, lined on both sides and at the end with into which it would be heroism run mad to penetrate. When it is remembered too that not the full number of boats is making the attack, but only the margin over and above those which have been thwarted or overpowered by the boats of the assailed fleet that can attack, I think it must be felt that a direct attack of the kind does not promise well.

Having discussed attack by small torpedo boats before battle joins, I now take up what they may do in the heat of action.

As the Combat deepens

2nd. When the heat of the battle is established, when smoke and confusion have brought about a certain degree of that obscurity, which is the proper field of the torpedo boats activity, there

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will be a much better chance of using them with success. The torpedo boat is a child of darkness, and the more conditions resemble its native element, the more success it can hope for. Nevertheless the conditions of action however close, will be far less favorable than those of night; in truth they will be much more like those attendant upon the open attack which we have just considered. The ships which they are to attack will be fully on their guard, and we may assume as certain that the crews of the machine and light guns, will need no stimulant to keep a look-out for their little enemy; there will be no waiting to see if an attack is meant on the particular ship, but the little ones will be shot at on sight whenever a glimpse is caught of them. (Danger from their own fleet. Whiting at Mobile. Mast troops at Trafalgar) It must always be kept in mind likewise that they will have their own kind to contend with in the enemy's ranks.

Take such an attack as that which I have imagined, upon a flank by Rams. There if ever would be a field for the Torpedo boats off the assailed fleet; but equally of course the assailants would cover the movement with their own boats, which would keep under the lee of the Rams till called to meet their kind.

What exactly close action may mean in the future is open to doubt. There will not probably be any great obscurity when more than a thousand yards separate the fleets. Within that distance, whatever the nature of the attack or defense, it is not likely that