Fleet Battle Tactics lectures, 1886 Apr-May

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height of, say, 12 feet, to which may be added. How squarely this may be presented to the enemy will depend upon the class of the ship; a thwartship bulkhead would be most favorable, with a circular turret; about half the shots that strike at all will be at or within an angle of 30 to 45 degrees from the perpendicular.

Such is not the most promising target in the world but a good shot, under moderate conditions of wind and sea which will generally be found in fleet fights; with clear weather; and with the modern gun of flat trajectory lying fore andaft would probably be able to hit it somewhere, two times out of four, at a distance of 2000 yards. Of these half will strike so as to penetrate up to a greater or les less proportion of their absolute penetrative power.

The injury done by projectiles penetrating will mainly be confined to the personnel or the battery, the chances of a shot disabling the motive power of a well protected ship are too slight to be considered. How great the injury to the fighting power of the ship of one or more successful shots will vary greatly. An English admiral says that no fight will be left in the men among whom a shell loaded with 37 pounds of powder has burst, and he is probably right. A one turreted ship under the supposition would be wholly disabled, unless she had a full relief crew for the guns. A ship receiving a heavy shell full on the pilot house, a perfectly possible chance, would be ruined for the moment; she would have literal

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ly lost her head, and would be helpless till a new commander had control both of the ship and the situation.

The character of the injury done by the gun then is to the personnel principally, the battery possibly in case a shell do not explode. In the old sea fights when penetration was effected the damage was mainly to the personnel. A ship was rarely sunk by the enemy's fire, rarely incapacitated by injuries to the hull. The determining injuries were those to the ship's company and to the masts. Indicentally damage must be done to parts of the hull, but with high velocities, the structure will not have time to resist other than locally and is likely to receive only than local harm. In the case however of revolving turrets, which cannot call upon the whole frame of the ship for support, there may well be sufficient displacement or disarrangement to disable them for the rest of the action. I remember reading some years ago, that the force o of impact of one of the Duilio's shot was sufficent to lift the turret in which it was, as high as the main top. If the calculation was correct it introduces an element of very serious injury which I have not claimed for the gun. How that force would be taken up is an intricate question, upon the solution of which would depend the character of the injury done and its extent as regards the life of the ship.

For obviously the ship, as a person, can receive a very extensive

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wound which is still of vastly less consequence than one much smaller, but of a different kind or in a different place. A small hole under water is much more dangerous than a big one well above.

And this remark leads naturally to considering the character of the injury done by the ram and the torpedo.

The two have this in common: that the injury done by each is mainly below water. In other respects they differ.

The effect produced by the ram is that of the impact of a large body moving slowly, and its blow, however instantaneous in appearance is really progressive in character. When specially fitted with the spur there will be penetration first, followed by pressure of the whole weight of one ship against the side of the other; the result depending upon the strength of the latter. For if it resist successfully i.e. if the side is not driven bodily in, or torn away (Harrington), the injury though serious in its nature will not be comparatively extensive; penetration will have been easy and circumscribed. If on the other hand the side yield, if plates are displaced and frames give, the danger is evidently greater.

The shock of the torpedo is instantaneous. There is here no question of velocity. However the torpedo gets in place, if it explode, its effect is the same; and with dynamite is literally instantaneous. It can with the auto-mobile be delivered farther under water than the ram and for teh same size the hole is propor

17 tionally more dangerous, while from the amount of the charge carried, a successfully exploded torpedo is likely to be far more destructive than the ram.

Whatever proportion of the effect reaches any part of the ship, exerts its power without there being any time for the parts to accomodate themselves. The only question for any part reached is how much of the strain has ben taken up in doing other damage. All this is opposite to and worse than the blow of the ram, which allows any elasticity in the hull, time to work. Moreover, if the torpedo is planted well under the bottom, the water, which can yield only in the direction of the air, will yield very little and the hull will receive the full injury of the charge.

The effect of a torpedo not auto-mobile, forced up against a ship's side, is similar; but from a torpedo boat or cruiser, or towed in the open sea could scarcely be carried so low and would proportionally lose in effect.

There seems therefore no avoiding the conclusion that granting the blow has been fairly delivered in both cases, i.e. granting equal "certainty", the injurious effect of the torpedo must be expected to be greater than that of the ram. The general character of the injury is the same in both, that is: it is done to the hull of the ship and below the water line, whereas that done by the gun is above the water line and mainly to the personnel and the battery.

18 The former attacks the life of the ship, her power of keeping above water; the latter attacks her fighting power (but in one element only) the injury being mainly confined to the personnel.

The life involves the fighting power, and if lost carries it down with it; but equally a ship of war has lost her life when she has lost her fighting power. It is told of Admiral Pellew that when his ship was in danger of foundering he refused to throw the battery overboard, looking upon the ship as worthless without her guns.

However it may be from the point of humanity, there can be no question from the military point of view. A ship which has lost her guns, has lost her power of offense beyond the range of her torpedoes, which as yet is, and probably always will be, much more circumscribed than that of guns. She is at the mercy of any vessel of equal speed with one efficient gun remaining.

The ram and the torpedo must therefore remain under one great disadvantage when compared with the gun, they are essentially short range weapons. To this must probably be added a much inferior practical 'certainty' or accuracy, owing both to intrinsic difficulty in handling, and much small frequency.

In estimating the character and extent of the injury inflicted both by the ram and the torpedo it must be rememberd that the vulnerability of the target against which they are directed is not the