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mishap during which the assailed dont know just what to do. The supposed very swift rams or torpedo vessels could cross the interval with a speed unattainable by the ship of the line, thus best seizing the flitting moments; they could return with equal speed if balked; they could when so returning, follow a route which would interpose an unwarrantable gap in the line of heavy ships, if such had been employed. The movement as described need by no means be isolated; on the contrary it would evidently be the game of the uncrippled fleet to stand down at once upon the eight remaining ships, in such wise as to separate them from those on the crippled wing, while the lighter vessels occupied and perhaps despatched the latter.
Whether such an attack could be made upon any position of an uncrippled line may be doubtful, though I think it could not be pronounced hopeless. Unless the fleet attacked should reserve its fire with very great coolness until the rams wereclose aboard, the great preponderance of chances are that vessels steaming in groups of three or four, and not hampered in their speed by the demands of order, would cross the interval without serious injury. (Jomini Cavalry P.306). The Board upon Harbor Defenses assumes as certain in its report that a fleet of vessels can pass any fortifications if the channel be unobstructed; that is that projectiles wont stop them and I apprehend the remark will be found generally true of underwater projectlies as well; and if ships can pass guns on
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on steady platforms, a fortiori pass them when mounted on shipboard
Even if not carried into effect, as a demonstration made up on the flank, or looking towards the rear of a flank, such a use of rams or torpedo vessels might well have a very distracting effect upon the enemy. His ships of the line could not be directed to their attack, nor under the suppositions catch them if they were.
All such operations are of course subsidiary in their general character, and though they may be of capital importance in a particular instance. The ram and the torpedo I consider, as I have already said, inferior weapons to the gun.
But I think it can be laid down with great positiveness as a [I?] rule almost never to be departed from, that the ships of the line must not be separated from one another by intervals that will give a chance for an enemy to push between; yet that such work as I have indicated should be done, and that there should therefore be special vessels to do it.
As to the character of those vessels we have these considerations: There is wanted first great speed and second to act close to the enemy; these are their main charaacteristics. They will have therefore the ram and the torpedo, close quarter weapons, for their particular offensive work; and the gun becomes then to them a secondary weapon. It follows that the gun need not be protected and to save weight any battery they carry should be unarmored. In making a dash, the guns crews should be withdrawn below, and the captains' attention wholly fixed upon collision. This ship de
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pends upon her legs and eyes; and I should be inclined, besides a specially thich armor on the pilot house, to further protect it by a semicircular breastwork from either beam round by the bows, so as to put the life of the captain beyond all peradventure. The engines must likewise be protected, but not extraordinarily; beyond this I would trust for defensive safety to speed and to making the target as small as possible. For the latter object if meant only to work with the fleet, I might be willing to dispense with the guns (Query would not their guns be a useful addition to the artillery fire?) but when detached they must be able to cope with cruisers of equal size. The use of vessels of this class in keeping on the heals of a retreating fleet embarrassed with crippled ships, in following the latter if they attempt to separate from the main body is obvious. (They would resemble modern cavalry which is now dismounted and fought as Infantry when an opportunity of- s fers.) The condition of exceptionally high speed carries with it the necessity of size sufficient to maintain their relative advantages in that respect in moderately rough weather.
I should favor therefore two principal classes of vessels for the fleet. One forming the chief reliance, the heavy armored ship, with the gun its main weapon of offense, and relying on its ram and torpedoes as secondary; the other smaller, armored only so as to protect the motive and directing power, expecting to act chiefly at close quarters, the ram and the torpedo forming the main weapons, the gun secondary. Speed is a prime requisite to both classes,
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but the latter to have it in excess.
(A comparatively new class of vessel is now being developed represented by the English Polyphemus and the French torpedo-ramcruiser Tage. The latter is 390 ft.long: 52 ft.beam, 7,054 tons displacement, mean draft of 23 ft. 10330 horse power, and intended to steam 19 knots. Has armor plated decks, battery bulkheads and armor belt.
The Spanish government has contracted with Messrs. Yarrow & Co for two first class torpedo boats of the Falke type - speed at deepload line 23 knots. Running light 25 knots - the highest speed yet contracted for. S.B.L.)
Granting that both classes of vessels be required, can any relative proportions be established as representing a probably maximum of efficiency?
Let us take the number of twelve ships of the line as a basis, how many close action ships should be assigned to such a fleet?
There does not seem any function of caring for the ships of the line, aiding or protecting them in any way, except from vessels of the ram class, which could guide us as to the proportions. The probable number wanted must be sought in the ranks of the enemy rather than in our own, with a margin for detachments.
We may assume that the fleet will not come to an open issue with one much superior to itself in numbers. We may therefore assume the opposing fleet to have about the same number, possibly
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It is evident that not less than two rams can attack a ship of the line and three would probably be a better number for a wholly isolated ship. Take however the case, supposed above, of two flank ships separated from the main body; it is likely that not more than two rams could attack each, for they, the two isolated ironclads, ought to be in supporting distance and their inner flanks so protected. Again, suppose a ram attack to be made upon a line, or battle order of the enemy, not yet broken by artillery or other causes, such attack must be made upon a limited portion of that line, while the artillery engages the remainder. How large a portion can be so attacked to advantage? I suppose we may say that an admiral would think he had made the very best disposition if he succeeded in attacking with his twelve line of battle ships, from one half to two thirds of the enemy's fleet - say from 6 to 8 ships. In a preliminary attack by rams, supported or not, I should say 4 at the most, probabaly not more than three, of the enemy's line would be aimed at. These would call for not less than six rams, eight would be much better and should be the number fixed. This number has reference only to be moment of action; if it be contemplated to employ the ram class of ships for detached duty, out of reach of recall when battle is imminent, the numbers must be proportionally increased.
In the two classes of vessels I have looked only at those