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19 same everywhere. We can no more count upon lodging a torpedo under the great central compartments, than we count upon every shot that hits at all hitting squarely. The same is true of the ram. To this uncertainty of hitting is to be added another arising from the numerous expedients in construction designed to baffle the effect of the blow of the torpedo or ram when successfully delivered; the greater or less penetrability, if I may use the word, of the submerged target that a ship presents. In the question of armor and guns we have a large series of experiments upon single plates, under different guns, from which we may draw approximate conclusions as to what may be expected under certain conditions. With regards to the ram the casualties of the sea supply from time to time impressive lessons as to its power; but on the whole the result is, in my mind adverse to the belief that a small thrust of a ram is likely to be fatal. The accident to the arizona running into an iceberg some years back, the result of the collision of the Oregon still recent, seem pretty fair tests of time. In the latter case more particuarly the blow was probably delivered by a very heavy vessel, considering the load, in a singularly vital point, and to a ship certainly not prepared as a ship of the line will henceforth be prepared to resist ramming; yet the ship was long kept, or rather remained afloat. With regard to the torpedo, I am not aware of any conclusive experiments. It may probably be assumed that be-
20 yond the limits occupied by the engines, a single torpedo will not cause a ship to sink; (under the central compartments?)
All the same however, a ship cannot receive such an injury in any part of her body and remain, for the time as efficient as she was before. Her speed, and possibly her handiness, can hardly fail to be affected, even if no worse come of it. Will she be a ship sunk, or will she be as a ship of olden days who has lost her topmasts? or again will she be as one who has lost all her lowermasts? a more, of a less, crippled ship - no longer able to follow the movements of the fleet, perhaps unable to keep up with a retreat, a burden and not a source of help to the Admiral. Crippled ships, and the unwillingness to sacrifice them, have brought on many sea fights and caused the failure of great enterprises; a very conspicuous instance being Rodney's victory over DeGrasse; a collision between two Frence ships here probably saved Jamaica to the English. In Lord Howe's action with the French on May 31st. 1794, the effort of the latter to resuce crippled ships lost them the weather gage, and enabled the English to bring on the decisive action of the next day. (Tourville at La Hague)
I have now presented to you the various considerations that have passed through my own mind affecting the actual and relative efficiency of these three arms under the heads proposed, viz: 1st. the certainty of attaining their object, or accuracy of aim; 2nd.
21 the character and 3d. the extent of the injury inflicted; 4th, though rather incidentally, the frequency of delivering the blow which affects both the certainty and the extent of the injuries inflicted; 5th, the distance at which they each can be used, in other words the range.
Upon these considerations and such others as may come into your own minds, you must form your own conclusions. Mine is that the gun is superior in certainty and frequency, as it undoubtedly is in range; that it is inferior in the character and extent of the single or individual injury inflicted, to the torpedo and probably to the ram; but that in actions between fleets, assumed to be practically equal, this inferiority is more than compensated for by its range and accuracy, and that it must under present conditions remain the chief weapon, and the vessels carrying it the backbone, of the deep sea fleet.
This conclusion I have thought worth working out for myself. Practically, whatever the relative stress laid upon either weapon by this or that person, the common sense of all services has decided that those ships which may suggestively be called line of battle ships, however different in type they are from the picture that word brings up, must have all three arms. The same common sense, or logic of experience, has decided that the ship shall be protected against the gun by armor of iron or steel, covering the vital parts
22 i.e. battery, motive and directing power, wherever exposed, above the water, whether that exposure be constant or only occasional; and against the torpedo or ram by a system or minute internal subdivision, which shall as far as possible confine the entrance of water to the region immediately perforated by either weapon, also other palliations.
The modern line of battle ship, the mainstay of the fleet, that which gives to it solidity and momentum, is therefore a heavy ship, carrying two batteries; one long range above water, the other of short range but below the surface; and provided with a ram that can be only used in collision, however its use may have been manoeuvred for at a distance. As well as its predecessor of 80 years ago it has its long guns, its short guns and its boarding weapons. (Quote Peter Simple as to running aboard and carrying away a jibboom and foretopmast.) This ship is primarily meant to work in co-operation with other ships and will only accidentally, and for a time be found alone, bearing on Harrington's problem. Its great size, weight and extensive provision for offense and defense indicate that it is meant for the days when great stakes are to be played for; the fate of a war, or a nation, perhaps to be decided. Its size and cost are unnecessary for minor issues, and too much of the nation's wealth and power are involved in one to be risked for a trifle. There must be smaller and lighter vessels for other
23 uses. The question will come up whether these can be used in fleet actions to advantage; whether from any point of view, or in any combination, they can be thrown against the heavier ships of an enemy's line (Single Type if possible)
The first consideration that strikes one is that these line-ofbattle ships, whatever speed they may individually have, can but rarely and for short periods put forth that full speed when acting in concert. Not only is the speed of a fleet that of its slowest ships, but there must be a certain reserve of speed to enable irregularities of position to be corrected. (Jouett's statement.) The difficulty also of maintaining any order increases rapidly as high rates of speed are attained; and although a high maximum of fleet speed may be reached by constant practice, yet such constant, or even frequent practice, will perhaps not be had under the expense and difficulty of maintaining the coal supply. The speed of some of the great new ironclads is given as 16 knots; but it may well be questioned whether ten of them could stand down upon an enemy and maintain any given order at a rate exceeding twelve knots. (Jomini cavalry p.306; also difficulty of line abreast - Suffren &c.) Yet it must certainly be feasible to put afloat vessels that will steam 18 knots in any weather in which a fleet can steam twelve, or in which fleets will be likely to engage.
Again: an attack made upon another fleet, in whatever order