ENPages
4 are doubless many more that might be brought forward, the absolute and relative value of these three weapons must as yet be considered matters of opinion. That a 12" or 16" shell striking fairly on the turret or water line of an ironclad would be most disastrous; that it would likewise be disastrous to be rammed squarely in your largest compartment; or to have a torpedo explode under the most vulnerable part of the hull may be fairly conceded; and the question may yet remain, in determining your choice of your principal weapon, which of the three is likely to hit most often and most fairly, and at the same time expose you yourself to the fewest chances of danger.
In weighing this quesion here, I will define the subject; perhaps I should rather say exclude those operations which, though belonging to the navy, are not here touched upon.
The subject allotted to me is more particuarly that of handling comparatively large squadrons; and does not involve the Tactics of single ships, unembarrassed o runhelpful by comrades, nor on the other hand the question of the attack or defense of Coasts directly. Whatever views I may advance have reference then to a sea going fleet, to its composition and movements; and I would like to take advantage of this particular place to disclaim any intention of speaking with authority or with any but the greatest diffidence. I have tried to arrrange and digest such matter as has come in my
5 way, to reflect upon the conditions of the problem now before us, and to apply to itsuch principles and maxims found in standard works on war in general as seemed of universal application.
The problem before us then has several successive steps for solution.
1st. To ascertain the real capabilities of each arm and to estimate its consequent probable value in action.
2nd. To deduce therefrom which is the real backbone of the fleet and which the accessories
3rd. To determain, within limits the relative proportions of each in a given fleet, keeping in view of course the special duty of such fleet.
4th. Having thus the compnents of the fleet to deduce the best dispositions for developing the full power of each arm, and for combining all there at any stage of an engagement; so as to bring out the fullest power of the fleet as a whole. This involves a study of the various orders possible and the feasibility of pass -ing from one to another in presence of and enemy. As a corollary to the 4th., we will have to examine the various means of forcing or avoiding action; of making or receiving an attack.
5th. There will be the question of chasing, both from the side of the pursuer and the pursued, as well before action, as after a more or less decisive battle.
6 It is obvious that, when men of rank and merit are still disputing about the weapons, any answer to the above questions can as yet claim to be only an attempt, more or less worthy at solution of the problem.
Our three weapons may all be considered as projectiles. In the case of one you hurl the ship herself, in the other two you hurl something out of her at your enemy.
I may point out that the Torpedo has something in common with the other two. When ejected from the ship as an auto mobile torpedo, its effect resembles that of the gun in being transferred to a distance. When dragged or driven against the enemy, by the close approach of the assailing ship, the mode of attack is little different from ramming. Undoubtedly, however, it has more family likeness to the gun. (The tendency since these words were written 2 1/2 years ago has been to discredit contact torpedoes) In decideing which of the three will do most injury to the enemy, we must consider that injury: 1st as to certianty 2nd as to character 3rd as to extent 4th as to frequency 5th from what distance (range) Though I have enumerated frequency separate from certainty I incline to think it an element of certainty, for the more often you use your weapon, the greater the possibility of its taking effect.
7 it enters however as an element both into the character and extent, and so may properly be separately mentioned.
The gun can be used more frequently, and it can be used efficaciously at a much greater distance, than the torpedo. Taking the extreme case of a vessel having torpedoes only, and one having guns only, the relative advantage is seen at once. On the other hand it may be said that within its range the auto-mobile torpedo is not so liable to lose its effect by a glancing blow. An attack made by several torpedo boats on one cruiser or iron-clad should doubtless be effective, one of them should succeed with absolute certainty in inflicting a most serious injury, but it is not to be presumed that such a concentration will be permitted, (under the conditions to which my subject is limited, excludes attacks from ports i.e.) in the face of a fleet which must be assumed to have its own small cruisers, or whatever other means the nation whose flag it carries has provided against a perfectly well known mode of attack. The first phase of this subject assumes fleets in presence practically equal; else one will fly. Concentration undoubtedly will be attempted, for concentration is the essence of scientific warfare; but in order to obtain it by our party we are not authorized to assume apathy or folly on the other. Such an advantage, i.e. of several torpedo boats concentrated on one ship, if obtained in the face of both fleets, is not to be considered as an advantage inherent in
8
the weapon, but as due to the superior tactics, skill or fortune of one side.
The accuracy of a projectile in actual use depends upon several important factors.
1st. There is the maximum accuracy: or practical accuracy attained under the most favorable conditions in the hands of experts - (on the range ground)
2nd. The standard of accuracy thus fixed is subject as we all know to painfully large reductions under the inevitable difficulties of actual service at sea and in battle.
the gun labors under the difficulties of an unsteady platform, and probably rapidly shifting target, the principle difficulty being due to the former (unsteadiness) which causes large vertical errors in the trajectory.
In the particular of rapid shifting the target is the same as for the gun, for the ram and torpedo, but there is nothing in them corresponding to the vertical errors due to unsteady platform. The auto-mobile torpedo, when it has settled down to its flight, [mai] maintains a practically flat trajectory; the trajectory of the ram regarded as a missile corresponds always with the surface of the ocean.
The case is reversed when we come to lateral errors. The highest speed as yet claimed even in idea (within my knowledge) for