Fleet Battle Tactics lectures, 1886 Apr-May

drawn up, whether awaiting attack or standing down to meet it, must be made partially on its front, and if partially outflanked the flank will not be found wholly without torpedo defense. For 500 yards, the range of the Whitehead, in every direction the torpedo must be feared, and in case of the pursuit of a retiring fleet probably contact torpedoes must be looked for. Will not prudence dictate that this space should first be crossed by vessels capable of much greater speed in smaller groups, and the crippling of which will be of less consequence than that of a line of battle ship. Beside these smaller ships can inflict as much damage as the torpedo; and as certain, though doubtless less extensive, damage with the ram as the most bulky. (This paragraph is very obscure and should be re-written. The gist of it is that the approach within torpedo range should when possible be given to rams & c. A.T.M.) Again look-out vessels are imperative for a fleet and they must be sufficiently numerous to spread over a large area ahead and on either side, perhaps also astern of the fleet. It would not be too much perhaps to say that in some directions the lane should be double. The number should be sufficient to allow of despatching in search of distant information or to carry back if necessary no news to a central point. Formerly the frigate fulfilled all these purposes and that of the cruiser and commerce destroyer as well, not much faster than the normal ship of the line, unless in light

25 airs, she was handier and at all events could be spared in case of a foe turning up unexpectedly, while the heavier ship could not. Whether the ordinary cruiser be attached to the modern fleet, or whether a special ship be built for the purpose, swift look-out sh ships are of the first importance. Accurate and speedy information is always of the first importance in war, on sea or land. The most conspicuous example of this necessity yielded by naval history is that of Lord Nelson before the battle of the Nile. (Such illustrations taken from history are valuable!) He had first been sent with three ships of the line and some frigates to watch Toulon when Bonaparte's expedition was preparing, with a destination wholly unknown to the English. While on this station he met with a violent gale in which his flag ship was dismasted, and nearly lost, and the squadron dispersed. The senior captain of the frigates reasoned that Nelson would have borne up for Gibraltar and accordingly went thither to seek him. Meanwhile Nelson, having refitted was joined by a detachment of ten ships of the line more, but with no other frigates and so started in pursuit of the French, whom he had reason to believe had gone to Egypt. He did not care to detach any of the large ships to any great distance, lest he should fall in with the enemy in their absence; he had no frigates; and so though he spread as broad a clue as he could and still keep his ships within call, he actually passed on beyond the great French fleet of over

26 a hundred sail in that narrow sea, reached Alexandria before it, and beat back up the Mediterranean to Sicily, agian, without seeing it. There is curious room for speculation as to what the result would have been to the fortunes of Napoleon had Nalson then had the frigates, the want of which he declard was graven on his heart. The result to Nelson nearly was the ruin of his career so great was the popular clamour. He would have been lost had they had telegrams in those days.

Doubtless it is not necessary to appeal to so signal an example to convince military men of the necessity of an efficient putpost and detached service, but the question awaits us in this day, shall the vessels for it be a class by themselves, mere dispatch vessels; shall they be ordinary cruisers detailed for the occasion, or shall they be vessels capable of taking a part, and a necessary, perhaps even decisive part on occasion. Shall the theoretically perfect fleet comprise only ships having chiefly their weight and solidity, or shall it also have those whose strength shall be in their speed and mobility? The old frigate had no aggressive part in the old fleet fight. To repeat signals; to take in tow disabled ships; at one short period to embark the commander-in-chief who was to direct his fleet from a central position better fitted for seeing, such were its principal functions. They did not even fight among themselves in fleet actions, and it is said to have been a

27 part of the courtesy of the sea for ships of the line not to fire upon them, unless they made themseles obnoxious.

The decision of the question raised will depend upon the part which may be proposed to assign to such swift and mobile vessels. Granted that you have them, what duty can be given them? what work can they do that cannot be quite as well done by the ship of the line proper. If there be such a duty, and if by their doing it the more important vessels will be economized, there can be no doubt that such vessels will be ueseful and in fact indispensable to the theoretical efficiency (practical completeness) of the fleet.

Let us suppose two fleets of equal numbers say twelve (12) lin line of battle ships in presence of each other and intending to fight. The object of each will be to come into battle with some advantage already gained over its opponent at the moment of close (decisive) action. This advantage must have been gained either by manoeuvring, or by some injury previously inflicted upon the enemy, by which the efficiency of some of his ships has been diminished. I leave out of consideration the chance of disability developing in the enemy's line by accidents, as belonging to the category of those chances which though they must be allowed for, cannot be counted upon in war.

Advantages to be gained by manoeuvring simply, I lay to one side for the moment; they are not of decisive consequence to the

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question immediately before us. In what ways may injury be inflict ed before the close contact of main bodies of the two fleets?

In the first place from a distance most obviously there is the artillery fire, as to which the effort must be to bring into action as many of your best guns as you can, without taking up a vicious formation for your fleet. In the second place there may be the opportunity of a sudden blow, depending for its success upon celerity and unexpectedness, with the torpedo orthe ram at close quarters (Jomini cavalry P.306) It might be, probably would be, most imprudent to hazard any of the ships of the line in such an attack; in which the risks are great and in which regularity of order must yield to rapididty of onslaught.

(Diagram) As an example of what I mean let us suppose that by your fire, concentrated by signal or previous instruction mainly upon them, you have seriously injured the third and fourth ships from one of the enemy's flanks; exactly the nature of the injury you may not know, but there is evident confusion in them. The two flanking ships are thereby separated from the body of their fleet, not only by the interval but, by the interposition of these crippled vessels. Not only does the injured fleet labor under these physical disadvantages, but there concurs with them that most inestimable to the chances offered by war to an assailant, the few moments of uncertainty and paralysis which follow immediately upon a sudden