| 30process, by which B has been derived from A has to
be accepted as beyond criticism, and it cannot properly
be represented by an argument, though it may be
closely analagous to a logical argument in other
respects. The truth is, that Aristotle, like all subsequent
Greeks, unless we except the Epicureans, looked upon
induction as logically indefensible. Consequently,
where it was sub-conscious, it was treated as infallible,
while it was not admitted into a scientific argument
at all.
The conception of an argument or inference as
a process only entitled to those designations by virtue
of its being a subject of logical criticism is one which
it is so important to grasp at the outset that I will
here advert to another error of Aristotle’s reasoning concerning
first principles, which is unimportant in itself, but
which leads to some further considerations on [these?] | 30process, by which B has been derived from A has to
be accepted as beyond criticism, and it cannot properly
be represented by an argument, though it may be
closely analagous to a logical argument in other
respects. The truth is, that Aristotle, like all subsequent
Greeks, unless we except the Epicureans, looked upon
induction as logically indefensible. Consequently,
where it was sub-conscious, it was treated as infallible,
while it was not admitted into a scientific argument
at all.
The conception of an argument or inference as
a process only entitled to those designations by virtue
of its being a subject of logical criticism is one which
it is so important to grasp at the outset that I will
here advert to another error of Aristotle’s reasoning concerning
first principles, which is unimportant in itself, but
which leads to some further considerations on [these] |