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process, by which B has been derived from A has to
be accepted as beyond criticism, and it cannot properly
be represented by an argument, though it may be
closely analagous to a logical argument in other
respects. The truth is, that Aristotle, like all the other subsequent
Greeks, unless we except the Epicureans, looked upon
induction as logically indefensible. Consequently,
where it was sub-conscious, it was treated as infallible,
while it was not admitted into a scientific argument
at all.

The conception of an argument or inference as
a process only entitled to those designations by virtue
of its being a subject of logical criticism is one which
it is so important to grasp at the outset that I will
here advert to another error of Aristotle’s reasoning concerning
first principles, which is unimportant in itself, but
which leads to some further considerations on [these?]

process, by which B has been derived from A has to
be accepted as beyond criticism, and it cannot properly
be represented by an argument, though it may be
closely analagous to a logical argument in other
respects. The truth is, that Aristotle, like all subsequent
Greeks, unless we except the Epicureans, looked upon
induction as logically indefensible. Consequently,
where it was sub-conscious, it was treated as infallible,
while it was not admitted into a scientific argument
at all.

The conception of an argument or inference as
a process only entitled to those designations by virtue
of its being a subject of logical criticism is one which
it is so important to grasp at the outset that I will
here advert to another error of Aristotle’s reasoning concerning
first principles, which is unimportant in itself, but
which leads to some further considerations on [these?]