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gnox at Sep 11, 2018 02:43 PM

32

φαν27

previous state. A Feeling is a state, which is in its entirety
in every moment of time as long as it endures. But a Feeling is not
a single state which is other than an exact reproduction of itself. For
if that reproduction is in the same mind it must be at a different time
and then the Being of the Feeling would be relative to the particular time
in which it occurred, which would be something different from the Feeling
itself, violating the definition which makes the Feelng to be all that it
is regardless of anything else. Or, if the reproduction were simultaneous
with the Feeling, it must be in another mind, and thus the identity
of the Feeling would depend upon the mind in which it was, which is
other than the Feeling; and again the definition would be violated in
the same way. Thus, any Feeling must be identical with any exact
duplicate of it, which is as much as to say that the Feeling is simply a

32

φαν27

previous state. A Feeling is a state, which is in its entirety
in every moment of time as long as it endures. But a Feeling is not
a single state which is other than an exact reproduction of itself. For
if that reproduction is in the same mind it must be at a different time
and then the Being of the Feeling would be relative to the particular time
in which it occurred, which would be something different from the Feeling
itself, violating the definition which makes the Feelng to be all that it
is regardless of anything else. Or, if the reproduction were simultaneous
with the Feeling, it must be in another mind, and thus the identity
of the Feeling would depend upon the mind in which it was, which is
other than the Feeling; and again the definition would be violated in
the same way. Thus, any Feeling must be identical with any exact
duplicate of it, which is as much as to say that the Feeling is simply a