32

G33

of signs of a third kind, which I term symbols; that is to say, signs
which represent their objects simply because they will be so understood,
or arbitrary signs. Such are all words, not even, I think, excepting perhaps proper names,
where the distinction between an a symbol and an index becomes almost too
fine to be drawn with certainty. Unless by the name be meant certain lines on
a certain individual piece of paper, or the single event of an a single utterance,
the name is a thought, and strictly is a general concept although a very
narrow one. Nor is it in fact connected with the real man, but is only connected
in thought with the thought of the man; and it stands for the real man only

G33

of signs of a third kind, which I term symbols; that is to say, signs which represent their objects simply because they will be so understood, or arbitrary signs. Such are all words, not even, I think, excepting proper names, where the distinction between a symbol and an index becomes almost too fine to be drawn with certainty. Unless by the name be meant certain lines on a certain individual piece of paper, or the single event of a single utterance, the name is a thought, and strictly is a general concept although a very narrow one. Nor is it in fact connected with the real man, but is only connected in thought with the thought of the man; and it stands for the real man only