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1908 Nov 30
Logic
I.i. 14

there being any facts that are inherently inexplicable; though for
himself he does not speculate upon the explanations of very
broad principles, such as the laws of motion, as the metaphysician does.
He does not, because he does not see how to attack such problems.
So he leaves them alone.

Now I propose to employ the word Science to mean the collective
and coöperative activity both of all and of any group of such men. In the
former acception I shall use it rather loosely. Yet there is one distinction
that I shall insist upon in both acceptions, and which you will
[??] think rather piddling, I trust you will come to see the impor-
tance of it. For I insist that Logic does not repose in any degree upon
any special science nor upon metaphysics. Nevertheless, I shall admit
that it supposes a number of truths which are ordinarily reckoned as parts