51

1906 Nov 12 (??note error on year)
Logic
33

It is plain then that what is visible and what is audible are
each many different visible and audible objects,
or percepts, which are representatives, or as I say, 'Instances,'
of the one assertion. I call the person who perceive an Instance of an
assertion, and who, in doing so, understands the assertion itself the
Interpreter. Now I maintain what you may a first think is a mistake,
that in order that the Interpreter may gather to what the assertion
relates, or as I phrase it, what its Subjects are one or other of two alternative means must be
provided. The first of these means is that the assertion should be provided either
as parts of it, or in so close understood relations to it, with(?)
as to amount virtually to that, with one or more (almost invariably at least two) Proper Names, or what functions
functions as such. By a Proper Name, I mean a name of anything considered as a single thing; and this thing
which the Proper Name denominates must have been

1906 Nov 12
Logic
33

It is plain then that what is visible and what is audible are
each many different visible and audible objects,
or percepts, which are representatives, or as I say, 'Instances,'
of the one assertion. I call the person who perceive an Instance of an
assertion, and who, in doing so, understands the assertion itself the
Interpreter. Now I maintain what you may a first think is a mistake,
that in order that the Interpreter may gather to what the assertion
relates, or as I phrase it, what its Subjects are one or other of two alternative means must be
provided. The first of these means is that the assertion should be provided either
as parts of it, or in so close understood relations to it, with(?)
as to amount virtually to that, with one or more (almost invariably at least two) Proper Names, or what functions
functions as such. By a Proper Name, I mean a name of anything considered as a single thing; and this thing
which the Proper Name denominates must have been