113

1908 Dec 1
Logic
I.i. 16

any degree, though I should admit that it were based on such
truths as that one sees things in spatial relations, that one can
recall past experiences, that one can imagine things one never experi-
enced, that recollections and fancies are not accompanied with that
insistence called "vividness" in anything like the degree that
experiences are, even when they had been expected, far less when they
are unexpected, that repetitions of the same kind of action produce faci-
lity in like actions afterward, and that repeatedly acting in
any determinate general ways upon occasions of experi-
encing certain kinds of objects or even upon imagining such occasions
give rise to "habits", or tendencies so to act upon future such occasions;
that a certain kind of effort called "making a resolution" will tend to cause determinations of our
dispositions so that we shall be apt to behave in accordance with

1908 Dec 1
Logic
I.i. 16

any degree, though I should admit that it were based on such
truths as that one sees things in spatial relations, that one can
recall past experiences, that one can imagine things one never experi-
enced, that recollections and fancies are not accompanied with that
insistence called "vividness" in anything like the degree that
experiences are, even when they had been expected, far less when they
are unexpected, that repetitions of the same kind of action produce faci-
lity in like actions afterward, and that repeatedly acting in
any determinate general ways upon occasions of experi-
encing certain kinds of objects or even upon imagining such occasions
give rise to "habits", or tendencies so to act upon future such occasions;
that a certain kind of effort called "making a resolution" will tend to cause determinations of our
dispositions so that we shall be apt to behave in accordance with