82

OverviewVersionsHelp

Here you can see all page revisions and compare the changes have been made in each revision. Left column shows the page title and transcription in the selected revision, right column shows what have been changed. Unchanged text is highlighted in white, deleted text is highlighted in red, and inserted text is highlighted in green color.

3 revisions
jeffdown1 at Jun 29, 2016 05:13 PM

82

1908 Nov 19
Logic
I.i. 1

Logic
Book I. Analysis of Thought.
Chapter I. Common Ground.

Your purpose in reading these pages has been mine in writing them, namely
that you should be enabled to reach the truth the more surely and expeditiously
for having studied them. If we succeed, it will be a great achievement
for us both. and For my part I shall feel as if I could
that having so succeeded with one, I may hope to succeed
with so many that all of us together shall move the world.
But as Archimedes said he could do that with his lever, but only if
he had a ποῦ στῶ , a where to stand, so I am obliged to remember
that no man can communicate the smallest item of information to his
brother-man unless they have a ποῦ στῶσι of common familiar
knowledge; where the word 'familiar' refers less to how well the object
is known than to the manner of the knowing, that is, directly in the object

82

1908 Nov 19
Logic
I.i. 1

Logic
Book I. Analysis of Thought.
Chapter I. Common Ground.

Your purpose in reading these pages has been mine in writing them, namely
that you should be enabled to reach the truth the more surely and expeditiously
for having studied them. If we succeed, it will be a great achievement
for us both. and For my part I shall feel as if I could
that having so succeeded with one, I may hope to succeed
with so many that all of us together shall move the world.
But as Archimedes said he could do that with his lever, but only if
he had a ??, a where to stand, so I am obliged to remember
that no man can communicate the smallest item of information to his
brother-man unless they have a ?? of common familar
knowledge; where the word 'familiar' refers less to how well the object
is known than to the manner of the knowing, that is, directly in the object