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48

beyond the limits of possible experience. But
we have direct experience of things in
themselves. Nothing can be more completely
false than that we can experience only
our own ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome
of all falsity. Our knowledge of things in
themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but
all experience and all knowledge is
knowledge of that which is independently
of being represented. Even lies invariably
contain this much truth, that they represent
themselves to be referrning to something whose
mode of being is independent of it being
represented. This is true even if the proposition
relates to an object of representation as such.

45

beyond the limits of possible experience.
But we have direct experience of things in themselves.
Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas.
That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity.
Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is independently of being represented.
Even lies invariably contain this much truth, that they represent themselves to be referrning to something whose mode of being is independent of it being represented.
This is true even if the proposition relates to an object of representation as such