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chiefly from his not recognizing any other mode of
being than Existence,— and what he calls Existenz is
a special variety of it merely,— regarded Pure
Being as pretty much the same as Nothing. It is true that
the word “existence” names, as if it were mere an abstract possibility, that which
is precisely the not having any being in abstract
possibility; and this circumstance, when you look upon existence
as the only being, seems to make existence all but the
same as nothing.

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the
peculiar flavor or color of mediation, we
have no really good word. Intention Mentality is, perhaps,
as good as any, poor and inadequate as it
is. Consciousness conveys too much the idea of a mere
feeling. There is [??? much] Firstness in it as to lose the Firstness
of Thirdness, largely

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness,

chiefly from his not recognizing any other mode of
being than Existence,— and what he calls Existenz is
a special variety of it merely,— regarded Pure
Being as pretty much the same as Nothing. It is true that
the word “existence” names, as if it were mere an abstract possibility, that which
is precisely the not having any being in abstract
possibility; and this circumstance, when you look upon existence
as the only being, seems to make existence all but the
same as nothing.

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the
peculiar flavor or color of mediation, we
have no really good word. Intention Mentality is, perhaps,
as good as any, poor and inadequate as it
is. Consciousness conveys too much the idea of a mere
feeling. There is [??? much] Firstness in it as to lose the Firstness
of Thirdness, largely

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness,