62

92

a little child in order to understand these
things. But past, present and future each
contains all three elements, and therefore,
there are other ways of comparing them
with these elements.
Yet well as the future, under this aspect of it, illustrates
Thirdness, if one looks upon a future contingent proposition, as Aristotle did, with
more reason than modern men can easily appreciate, as a proposition which
is not yet either true or false, then the future seems to show Firstness. If
on the other hand we say that when a man is in a struggle of effort, it is the future
that he is struggling to affect, then we detect an element of Secondness in the Future.

A quality, or Firstness, has mere logical
possibility,— that is, such being as an idea
can contain in itself. But it is a positive determinate possibility.
a fact, or Secondness, has actuality. A sign, or Thirdness, as bringing
about facts, has power, or necessity, but
a kind of necessity which is neither a mere
negation absence of possibility nor a blind compulsion,
but an intellectual necessity.

It is very curious, not to say surprising,
that Where Secondness is predominant, dichotomies