The extreme case kind of Secondness which I have just described is
the relation of a quality to the matter in which
that quality inheres. The mode of being of the quality
is that of Firstness. That is to say, it is a possibility. It is related to the matter
accidentally; and this relation does not change
the quality at all, except that it imparts existence,
that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it.
But the matter, on the other hand, has no being
at all except the being that a subject of qualities.
This relation of really having qualities constitutes its
existence. But if all its qualities were to be taken
away, and it were to be left quality-less matter,
it not only would not exist, but it would not
have any positive definite possibility,— such as an
unembodied quality has. It would be nothing, at all.
EN