logical disposition.
This part of the argument cannot be rectified as I suggested that the other part might by substituting the logical norm, because it is perfectly unthinkable that the last argument of the criticism should not itself be criticized but should be left in its first state of an irresisible inference.
In that case there will be no appeal to a logical norm.
Indeed, if we come to the question of what is thinkable, it is perfectly thinkable that there should be no norm at all, but that the conclusion should be drawn by force of a disposition determined directly by the general logical ideal.
We can see how this is by reverting to the moral problem.
Suppose a man to be a utilitarian that is to hold that the highest morality consists in acting for the greatest good of the greatest number.
Then if he thinks it wise to do so, he may dismiss all rules of morality from his mind and never think of what the moral law commands but
EN