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laika at May 02, 2018 10:29 AM

143

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that there is no distinction between good and bad reasoning.
It is true that when a man draws a necessary conclusion, by which we mean a conclusion that appears to him to be necessary at the moment, it is irresistible; and therefore, at that point, it is quite true that there is no distinction between a good and a bad inference.
But then, so far, there is no reasoning.
For reasoning does not consist in the first impulse to accept [?] conclusion, but in the deliberate accaptance of it, after examining to see whether there be any room for the possibility that the conclusion should be false while the premisses are true.
It is said that this examination involves drawing a conclusion and if that conclusion is to be criticzed, a further conclusion is required and that thus we must ultimately "rest on the assumption that what seems sound reasoning is so."

143

15

that there is no distinction between good and bad reasoning.
It is true that when a man draws a necessary conclusion, by which we mean a conclusion that appears to him to be necessary at the moment, it is irresistible; and therefore, at that point, it is quite true that there is no distinction between a good and a bad inference.
But then, so far, there is no reasoning.
For reasoning does not consist in the first impulse to accept [?] conclusion, but in the deliberate accaptance of it, after examining to see whether there be any room for the possibility that the conclusion should be false while the premisses are true.
It is said that this examination involves drawing a conclusion and if that conclusion is to be criticzed, a further conclusion is required and that thus we must ultimately "rest on the assumption that what seems sound reasoning is so."