great that for a whole generation, the main body of modern psychologists have opined that the mind is an idle spectator of our actions and plays no real part in them.
When this hypothesis was first suggested by Winds, the logic of scientific procedure imperatively commanded its thorough trail.
For nearly forty years it has been tried; and now there begins to rise a general conviction that it will not do.
I the first place all scientific explanation must consist in describing the general course of events in terms clearly intelligible.
Now the most intelligible of all things is the relation of a conclusion to its premisses.
To substitute therefore for the conception that we conclude to do what we do, the conception that the action blind matter brings our acts to pass, seems like substituting the intrinsicallu unintelligible for the intrinsically intelligible.
In the second place, there is a much clearer objection.
It is that the difficulty of the problem of the connection of soul and body is essentially the same as that of the medieval problem of the principle of individuation + the hypothesis of parallelism does not meet that in the least.
EN