EN157
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4 revisions | Michael.Seidel at Apr 05, 2021 06:28 PM | |
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157Logic IV. 163 to historic Socrates emphasized the more important method of logical definition. Plato, as everybody knows, preferred division by dichotomy. Since Kant, trichotomic division has been favored. But in truth, it is not the number but the principle which is important. Generally, in philosophy, the most fundamental divisions ought to be trichotomic; but in certain fields dichotomy is preferable; and where the matter is orefuly experiential, polytomy will usually result. After a good deal of verbiage, two principles are adopted: first that the good is perfect; and secondly, that it is sufficient (20CD). Then since the good is sufficient, we may compare a life of pleasure without knowledge and a life of knowledge without pleasure; for the good being sufficient needs nothing else to be added to it. So [?] [?] whether either of the two states is satisfactory. (20E) Protarchus, at first, gives the simple judgment that if it was guilty pleasure, the life without knowledge would be satisfactory. Of course, this is so. The true | 157Logic IV. 163 to historic Socrates emphasized the more important method of logical definition. Plato, as everybody knows, preferred division by dichotomy. Since Kant, trichotomic division has been favored. But in truth, it is not the number but the principle which is important. Generally, in philosophy, the most fundamental divisions ought to be trichotomic; but in certain fields dichotomy is preferable; and where the matter is orefuly experiential, polytomy will usually result. After a good deal of verbiage, two principles are adopted: first that the good is perfect; and secondly, that it is sufficient (20CD). Then since the good is sufficient, we may compare a life of pleasure without knowledge and a life of knowledge without pleasure; for the good being sufficient needs nothing else to be added to it. So [?] [?] whether either of the two states is satisfactory. (20E) Protarchus, at first, gives the simple judgment that if it was guilty pleasaure, the life without knowledge would be satisfactory. Of course, this is so. The true |