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Michael.Seidel at Nov 24, 2020 10:51 PM

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Logic IV. 127 1/2
conception of the Absolute, we know not what, is absurd. At the same time, we are quite willing to believe that it is absurd, since no arguments in its favor that we have ever met have the slightest weight or relevancy.

2nd, Plato, apparantly quite unaware that if a thing is absurd, it can, at once, be proved both to possess and to want every character, procees, at intolerable length, and with the same, or even worse, triviality, to disprove everything of the one which he had just proved. This fills fifteen pages (142A - 157B), unrelieved by one glimmer of good sense.

3rd, Equally unaware that from an absurd hypothesis any consequence whatever may be deduced, without resort to flimsy reasons in which he indulges, Plato next proceeds to show that if the One is, other things will partake of this One (154C), and the things which partake of the one will be innumerable (158B), and yet limited, and they will both like and unlike one another and themselves (158E), and have contrary attributes of all kinds.

4th, He next shows that from the same hypothesis, the reverse conclusions follow in regard to the [not?] One.

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