36

Logic II 36

that the idea calls new matter into existence? Certainly
not. That would be pure intellectualism, which denies
that blind force is an element of experience distinct
from rationality or logical force. I believe that to be a
great error; but I need not stop to disprove it now, for those
who entertain it will be on my side in regard to classification.
But it will be urged that if that is not my meaning,
then the idea merely confers upon those objects the members
of the class its character, any one class is as "natural" or
"real" as another, in if [?] that term be taken in the
sense I give to it. I cannot, however, quite admit that.
Whether or not every class is or is not more or less a natural
class is a question which may be worth consideration; but
I do not think that the influence relation of the idea upon to the
members of the natural class is simply that they have it is applicable
to them as a predicate, as it is to every class equally.

Logic II 36

that the idea calls new matter into existence? Certainly
not. That would be pure intellectualism, which denies
that blind force is an element of experience distinct
from rationality or logical force. I believe that to be a
great error; but I need not stop to disprove it now, for those
who entertain it will be on my side in regard to classification.
But it will be urged that if that is not my meaning,
then the idea merely confers upon those objects the members
of the class its character, any one class is as "natural" or
"real" as another, in if [?] that term be taken in the
sense I give to it. I cannot, however, quite admit that.
Whether or not every class is or is not more or less a natural
class is a question which may be worth consideration; but
I do not think that the influence relation of the idea upon to the
members of the natural class is simply that they have it is applicable
to them as a predicate, as it is to every class equally.