my doctrine has been immensely improved since my
essay 'On the Theory of Probable Reasoning' was pub=
lished in 1883. In what i there said about "Hypothetic
Inference" I was an explorer upon untrodden ground.
I committed, though I half corrected, a slight positive
error, which is easily set right without essentially
altering my position. But my capital error was a
negative one, in not perceiving that, according to my
own principles, the reasoning with which I was there
dealing could not be the reasoning by which we are
led to adopt a hypothesis, although I all but stated
as much. But I was too much taken up in considering
syllopistic forms and the doctrine of logical extension
and comprehension, both of which I made more
fundamental than they really are. As long as I held,
that opinion, my conceptions of Abduction necessarily
confused two different kinds of reasonings. When, after
separated attempts, I finally succeeded in cleaning
EN