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jasirs94 at Nov 26, 2016 09:30 PM

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Classification of the Sci
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Definition of a Human Instinct, as the term will here be used. An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of his Nature (or that within him who makes his behaviour to be such as it is), manifested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour. In man, at least, this behaviour is always conscious, and not purely spasmodic, and is almost always partially controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflexion; but its adaptation to its quasi-purpose is invariably in part not so controlled. The behaviour in question generally involves feeling, the putting forth of mechanical energy, and cognition. The unity of quasipurpose has two parts. In the first place, the behaviour is such as might be expected to lead to a certain result, and if this is frustrated or appears destined to be frustrated, a new impulse will produce another more or less independent line of behaviour which might be expected to produce the same result in another way. This identical result consists, on any one occasion, in a certain general predi-

124

Classification of the Sci
25

Definition of a Human Instinct, as the term will here be used. An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of his Nature (or that within him who makes his behaviour to be such as it is), manifested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour. In man, at least, this behaviour is always conscious, and not purely spasmodic, and is almost always partially controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflexion; but its adaptation to its quasi-purpose is invariably in part not so controlled. The behaviour in question generally involves feeling, the putting forth of mechanical energy, and cognition. The unity of quasipurpose has two parts. In the first place, the behaviour is such as might be expected to lead to a certain result, and if this is frustrated or appears destined to be frustrated, a new impulse will produce another more or less independent line of behaviour which might be expected to produce the same result in another way. This identical result consists, on any one occasion, in a certain general predi-