p. 2

The Reviewer attacks what appears to him the twofold and contradictory
definition of the object matter of Logic (p. 208). The case simply stands thus. Dr. W.
in his definition of Logic leaves a void, which in another part of the work he
supplies, giving it to be understood, distinctly enough at the time that he sup-
plies it, that the supplement is to be borne in mind & added to the Definition,
when the Definition occurs. The Reviewer himself quotes the following passage.
"In introducing the mention of language previously to the Definition of Logic, I
"have departed from established practice in order that it may be clearly un-
derstood that Logic is entirely conversant about Language." - The words
previously to the Definition," and the allusion to "established practice" surely
point out sufficiently clearly {caret: "that"} his Definition, when it comes, will require the
addition of the part about Language. The Reviewer, by attending only to the
latter part of the explanation manages ingeniously enough to make out a seem-
ing case of contradiction; - by putting 'language' for the object matter itself,
instead of considering it (which from the context is evidently the meaning of the
[p]assage.) the mode in which the object-matter is to be viewed. Logic take cog-
nisance of the process of reasoning, not as it is in itself, but as we perceive it; &
Language is the symbol of what goes on in the mind. So, as a matter of fact, Logic
is concerned with reasoning only as it comes out in Language.

As to the Sketch of the History of Logic, why should it not be confessed to be
reason?- The history of Logic is not the subject of the work. We finished things up
according to their importance - the πὰρϵρ γα need not be elaborate. The work is
intended to bring out one or two ideas strongly & everything else is subordi-
nate consideration. [I think it is very probably I took part of what I put down
from Aldrich.]

The Reviewer attacks what appears to him the twofold and contradictory
definition of the object matter of Logic (p. 208). The case simply stands thus. Dr. W.
in his definition of Logic leaves a void, which in another part of the work he
supplies, giving it to be understood, distinctly enough at the time that he sup-
plies it, that the supplement is to be borne in mind & added to the Definition,
when the Definition occurs. The Reviewer himself quotes the following passage.
"In introducing the mention of language previously to the Definition of Logic, I
"have departed from established practice in order that it may be clearly un-
derstood that Logic is entirely conversant about Language." - The words
previously to the Definition," and the allusion to "established practice" surely
point out sufficiently clearly {caret: "that"} his Definition, when it comes, will require the
addition of the part about Language. The Reviewer, by attending only to the
latter part of the explanation manages ingeniously enough to make out a seem-
ing case of contradiction; - by putting 'language' for the object matter itself,
instead of considering it (which from the context is evidently the meaning of the
[p]assage.) the mode in which the object-matter is to be viewed. Logic take cog-
nisance of the process of reasoning, not as it is in itself, but as we perceive it; &
Language is the symbol of what goes on in the mind. So, as a matter of fact, Logic
is concerned with reasoning only as it comes out in Language.

As to the Sketch of the History of Logic, why should it not be confessed to be
reason?- The history of Logic is not the subject of the work. We finished things up
according to their importance - the πὰρϵρ γα need not be elaborate. The work is
intended to bring out one or two ideas strongly & everything else is subordi-
nate consideration. [I think it is very probably I took part of what I put down
from Aldrich.]