MS 427a (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter II - Section I

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{Section title: Classificatory Science more than Taxonomy}

I have now said enough for our present purpose concerning the discovery of natural or real classes. Having found the natural classes of the objects to be classified, we shall then use the same methods, -- probably, in most cases, the third, -- in order to discover the natural classes of those classes that one have found. Is the the whole business of classification? No serious student can hold it to be so. The classes found have to be defined, naturally if possible, but if not, then at least conveniently for the purposes of science. They have not only to be defined but described, a business to which/ a story without an end. This applies, of course, not merely to the species of immediate classes of the objects described, but of the higher orders of classes. There may also be relations between the different classes relations, each of which relates are appertain just as much to the descriptions of any one of the set of classes to which it belongs as to any other.

In regard to the higher orders of classes, among so far as concerns animals

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{Section title: Categories of Natural Classification.}

Louis Agassiz thought that he was able to characterize in general terms the different categories of classes which zoologists talk of. That is, he undertook to say what sort of characters distingush branches from branches, classes from classes, orders from orders, families from families, genera from genera, and species from species. His general classification of animals has passed away; and few naturalists attach any much importance to his characterizations of the categories. Yet they are the outcome of his deep study, and it is a merit of them that there is they involve no attempt to hard abstract accuracy of statement. How can he have been so long immersed in the study of nature without some truth sticking to him? I will just set down his vague definitions and allow myself to be vaguely influenced by them, so far as I find anything in the facts that answers to his descriptions. Although I am an ignoramus in biology, I ought by this time to recognize metaphysics when I meet with it; and it is apparent to me that [they?] those biologists

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whose notions views of classification are most opposite to those of Agassiz are saturated with metaphysics in its dangerous form, -- i.e. the unconscious form, -- to such an extent that what they say upon this subject is rather the expression of a traditionally absorbed fourteenth century metaphysics than of scientific observation.

{Marginal note: ^* Essay on Classification. 4th. 1857. p.170. The reader will perceive by the date, that these ideas were put forth at a somewhat inauspicious moment.}

The definitions of Agassiz are as follows: It would be useless for our purpose to copy the definitions of Agassiz^* had he not expressed them in the briefest terms, as follows:

Branches are characterized by the plan of structure;

Classes, by the manner in which that plan is extended, as far as ways and means are concerned; ["Structure is the watchword for the recognition of classes." p. 145]

Orders, by the degrees of complication of that structure; ["The leading idea . . is that of a definite truth among them", p. 151]

Families by their form, as determined by structures; ["When

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we see new animals, does not the first glance, that is, the first impression made upon us by their form, give us a very correct idea of their nearest relationship? ... So form is characteristic of families ... I do not mean the mere outline, but form as determined by structure" pp. 159, 160]

Genera by the details of the execution in special parts;

Species by the relations of individuals to one another and to the world in which they live, as well as by the properties of their parts, their ornamentation, etc.

{Section title: All Classification is governed by Ideas.}

All classification, whether artificial or natural, is the arrangement of objects according to ideas. A natural classification is the arrangement of them according to those ideas from which their existence results. No greater merit can a taxonomist have than that of having his eyes open to the ideas in nature; no greater more deplorable blindness can strike afflict him than that of not seeing that there are ideas in nature which determine the existence of objects.

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not so much spoken in their character of scientific observers The definitions of Agassiz will, at least, have the do us the service as it is the expression of a traditionally absorbed of directing our attention to the supreme importance of bearing in fourteenth century metaphysics, quite in conflict with mind the final cause of objects in [???] finding out their own modern science. The naturalists thus leave us with very natural classifications.

Little true light upon this important question.

So much in regard to classification. Now if we are to classify the sciences, it is highly desirable that we should begin by with a definite notion of what we mean by a science; and in view of what has been said of natural classification, it is plainly important that our notion of science should be a notion of science as it lives and not a mere abstract definition. Let us remember that science is a pursuit of living men, and that its most marked characteristic is that, when it is genuine, it is in an perpetual incessant state of metabolism and growth. If we resort to a dictionary, we shall be told that it is systematized knowledge. Most of the classifications of the sciences have been classifications