74

O.15

of inquiry, consists in. Now the reason given for this is so flimsy, while the inference is so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that the argument of that essay may justly be said to beg the question. The first part of the essay, however, is occupied with showing that, if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which would ultimately arise if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and unshakable issue. This is a very different position from that of Mr. Schiller and the pragmatists of today, whose avowedly undefinable position seems to me to be more characterized by angry hatred of logic and some disposition to rate exact thought as all humbug, than by anything more definite. At the same time, I hasten to add that their partial acceptance of the pragmaticist principle and their very casting aside of difficult distinctions has enabled them clearly to discern some very fundamental truths that other philosophers have seen only through a mist, or not at all. Among such truths, (all of them old enough,) I reckon the denial