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New radiobeacon monitoring instructions were prepared by the Communications Officer together with a communication chart for reporting radiobeacon failures, and showing all teletype, land line or radio connections in the District. A neon light bulb was installed in the pilot house of the COLUMBIA RIVER LIGHTSHIP as a visual check of the radiobeacon. The Quartermaster was instructed to check the timing every half hour.
The instructions for monitoring, as set up by the Communications Officer, were an improved revision over earlier procedure. Defective operation was determined to be:
(a) Incorrect timing in excess of five seconds.
(b) Improper frequency plus or minus .01% of the assigned frequency.
(c) Lack of tone modulation.
(d) Slurred or broken characteristics.
(e) Increased number of characteristics per minute.
(f) Sub-normal signal strength.
(g) Continuous operation for calibration purposes during the regular operating periods.
All previous instructions conflicting with the new regulations were cancelled. The District Coast Guard Officer further instructed that radio technicians be assigned only to such duty as that for which they had been trained and were not to be used in any other capacity. Commanding Officers were instructed to see that these assignments were carefully made.
Although radiobeacon alarm units were issued by Headquarters for installation on District radiobeacons, they had not been found completely successful. A radiobeacon alarm unit was improved by Chief Radio Technician D. W. Reid and was installed at West Point for thirty days' trial under Headquarters' authority. During this trial, the radiobeacon alarm unit proved successful as no failures were reported. As a result, Headquarters requested that a similar unit be forwarded to Norfolk to be tried there. No results of the Norfolk trial were received from Headquarters but the unit at West Point was still working successfully.
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Causes of radiobeacon failures were generally easily repairs, but it was the duration of these failures which the District Coast Guard Office worked incessantly to overcome. Monitor stations experienced great difficulty, at times, in notifying an offending station of its inoperation due to the frequent inability to make radio contact with the radiobeacon station which necessitated routing the message through other stations or agencies. Heavy storms in the area destroyed telephone communication and on occasion, visual signals had to be relayed to certain stations. Alarm units, as noted above, were not perfected, so frequently radiobeacon stations were unaware of their defective operation until notified by the Monitor Station. Had there been some means for notifying, under all conditions, the radiobeacon station of its faulty operation immediately after the failure was detected, the duration of faulty operation would have been greatly reduced.
Although the radiobeacons in this District were not operating at 100% efficiency, it was the opinion of the District Office that the beacons were operating on a par with beacons throughout the continental United States. This was determined by the reports from mariners and airmen who used beacons as navigational aids and was also due to the determination of the Aids to Navigation Officer to increase the efficiency of the beacons.
A radiobeacon buoy with a working range from 7 to 50 miles had been developed and was considered in the 13th Naval District the year before the war. Trials were made on batteries in some of the rough waters along the coast and on the Columbia River Bar. The batteries proved too fragile so dry packs were tested; these, too, developed defects. As the packs cost $40.00 a piece, much experimentation proved too costly. The District Coast Guard Officer saw the advantage of a perfected radiobeacon buoy in that a string of such buoys along the coast, 15 to 20 miles apart on the 30 fathom curve, would eliminate the necessity of the UMATILLA REEF LIGHTSHIP; the removal of the Lightship would counteract the use of tenders servicing the equipment (buoys had to be serviced every 4 months), as well as the cost. The Aids to Navigation Officer and the District Coast Guard Officer were both in favor of the establishment of a radiobeacon buoy at Grays Harbor Entrance where there had been considerable agitation for a Lightship; this station was within easy run for the CGC MANZANITA. Had the buoy proved applicable to conditions at Grays Harbor, buoys could have easily been installed at Duntze Rock, Yaquina Bay, Tillamook Rock, Umpqua, Coos Bay and Wherever tender equipment was available.
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Further consideration of the radiobeacon buoy was discontinued during the war, but the feasibility of replacing the lightship with a radiobeacon buoy rose again at the conclusion of hostilities.
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One of the most remarkable advances in inland marine navigation was that which tranferred the swirling waters of the Columbia river into 300 miles of navigable waterway. In 1805, when Lewis and Clark concluded their amazing trek to the Northwest Coast, vast portions of the Columbia River defied the explorers' attempts to transport their party and supplies on its broad expanse. Almost 140 years later, great ocean-going vessels were able to ply their way into Oregon and Washington river ports.
The wildness of the river lay in the swiftness of the water forming treacherous whirlpools and rapids over the shallow, jagged bottom. To eliminate this danger, two great projects were undertaken: The Bonneville Dam and the Celilo Canal. Although the canal was finished before World War I, river traffic to The Dalles, Oregon, and beyond, had ceased around 1916. In 1932, navigation in this section was revived for the transportation of wheat, but the service between the Upper and Lower ports was intermittent. This renewal of navigation was more or less on a trial basis to determine if sufficient commerce could be developed to support water carrier operation.
Sufficient traffic was realized and, after the construction of the Bonneville Dam which was completed in 1938, river traffic expanded into the movement of great steel barges designed to carry liquid petroleum in the hull and package or bulk cargo on deck. With this increase of traffic from Astoria, Oregon, beyond The Dalles, Oregon, the necessity of navigational aids to insure the mariner's safety became most apparent. As a result, the Seattle District centered the majority of its activities in the promotion of safe navigation along the river. Here was the proving grounds for experimental light structures and buoys to determine those most suitable for the area. Due to the rapid current, ranges marking channels had to be so perfected as to enable the mariners to ascertain his course in split-second timing.
The sheer steep cliffs of this area presented problems in erecting shore structures and the swift waters made the mooring of buoys almost impossible. Even before the consolidation of the Lighthouse Service and the Coast Guard, the problems of marking the river had been of primary importance to the Lighthouse Service and basic markings had been established along the banks. The last allotment made to the Service in 1939 was for the establishment of additional lights in the Columbia, Umpqua and Yaquina Bay. River traffic
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at that time consisted mainly of the transportation of oil to inland ports and the movement of wheat downstream. Although the water was proven open to ocean-going vessels, the majority of the craft were tugboats and freight barges, especially the section above Celilo, Oregon. Several "oil tank farms" had been established along the shore to supply Army and Navy installations in that area and it was from these "farms" that the vast supply of oil and fuel came, so necessary in the Dupont project at Hanford, one of the plants that specialized in the manifacture of the Atomic Bomb. War gave emphasis to the river traffic and, subsequently, the Atomic Bomb. War gave emphasis to the river traffic and, subsequently, the Aids to Navigation Section of the Seattle District concentrated on lessening the danger and increasing the safety of those who plied the columbia.