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in the use of it, in which it's inductive origin must be steadily kept
in view as the compass by which we are to steer our bark safely on
this ocean of probability. Induction might be accurately defined as the
virtual inference of a probability, if probability could
be defined without the idea of induction. When the
philosophy of probability has once been put upon a
sure footing, the question of inverse probabilities gives
no serious difficulty. Nobody can go further than I in
condemnation of this way of using probability, which
completely [vitiate?] the theory and practice of inductive
and Abductive reasoning, has set back civilization,
and has corrupted ideals, to an extent so far beyond what
anybody would believe possible without careful exami-
nation of the facts, that I know I must be laughed at
for what seems a most ridiculous judgment. The
[reader?] would perhaps, at length, go with one if I could in this work
enter into the history of current beliefs.

The discussion of probability naturally brings us
to the interesting question of the validity of induction.