7

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On the other hand, we shall find reason to maintain, with Auguste Comte, that a sound theory cannot be sound unless it be susceptible of applications, immediate or remote, whether it be good economy so to apply it, or not. This is perhaps no more true of logic than of other theories; simply because it it perfectly true of all. But there is a special reason why it is more important to bear this point in mind in logic. Namely, logic is the theory of right reasoning, of what reasoning ought to be, not of what it is. On that account, it used to be called a directive science, but of late years, Überweg's {Refers to Friedrich Ueberweg (1826-1871)} adjective normative* has been generally substituted. It might be

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* The latter word is not, at least to one individual whom I [w....] particularly pleasing. The verb, normo, to square, is in the dictionary, but what ordinary reader of Latin can remember having met with it? Yet if the presumable motive for the substitution of the new adjective, namely, its avoidance of an apparent implication in directive that logic is a a mere art or practical science, approves itself to us. The XXth century would laugh at us if we were too squeamish about the word's legitimacy of birth.