13

OverviewVersionsHelp

Facsimile

Transcription

Status: Complete

4

in exceptional cases alone can any definite deduction from it be made. How, for example, can we know what the conduct of an omniscient being would be, especially when, being also omnipotent, he can have nothing like what we call experience, desire, or intention? Indeed, since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason for holding that what we call consciousness is nothing but the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, (or, at any rate, some visceral sensation,) God probably has no consciousness. But most of us are in the habit of attributing more importance to this function than it really possesses (See James's paper Does 'Consciousness' Exist? in Jour. Phil. Psy. Sci. Meth. I.477; 1904 Sep. 1.)

On the other hand, among the many pertinent considerations which have been crowded out of this article, I may just mention, in the third place, that it could have been shown that the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion as it may seem. On the contrary, it is so connected with a theory of the nature of thinking, that if this be proved, so is that. Now there is no such difficulty in tracing experiential consequences of this theory of thinking as there are in attempting directly to trace out other consequences of God's reality.

In so short an article, it could not be expected that I should take notice of objections. Yet objections, such as they are, are obvious enough, and a few

Notes and Questions

Nobody has written a note for this page yet

Please sign in to write a note for this page