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it is an idea of which Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness are component parts, since the distinction
depends on whether the two elements of
Firstness and Secondness that are united are so
united as to be One or whether they remain Two.
This distinction between two kinds of Seconds, which
is almost involved in the very idea of a Second, makes
a distinction between two kinds of Secondness; namely, the
Secondness of Genuine Seconds, or matters, which I call genuine Secondness, and the Secondness
in which one of the seconds is only a Firstness, which I call degenerate Secondness; so that this
Secondness really amounts to nothing but this, that a subject, in its
being a Second, has a Firstness, or quality.
It is to be remarked that this distinction arose from attending to extreme cases;
and consequently subdivision will be attached to it
according to the more or less essential or accidental nature
of the Genuine or the Degenerate Secondness. With this
distinction Thirdness has nothing to do, or at any rate
has so little to do that a satisfactory account of the
distinction need not mention Thirdness.