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because it seems good to him; or if he inquires whether it be good or not, he has to do so by reasoning; and this reasoning in its turn must either be adopted because it seems good to him, or else depends on other reasoning.
Ultimately, it has to be admitted that what seems to be good reasoning is good reasoning.
There can be no other ultimate test.
But all reasoning seems good to the reasoner, and therefore there can be no bad reasoning; although reasoning which is at one time good, namely when it exists as reasoning, may subsequently, when it no longer exists as reasoning, not seem good.

This is the fallacy which I propose to refute.
But before doing so, in order to throw a clearer light on the matter, I will call your attention to the fact that this fallacy is precisely analogous to another to which as to the other that [u?t] stated different writers give different terms , but which in its