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allow a distinctly better explanation of the dialogue being dedicated to this unimportant person that the hypothesis that Plato have been thrown in with him a quarter of a century before the dialogue was written.

If the reader thinks the Theaetetus is as unreadable a dialogue as Plato could write, he cannot know the Parminedes. This concerns the One. A vast number of arguments, any one of which is far worse than other than any other of them, are adduced in support of the following positions:

1st, [?] the one is it cannot have parts (137CD), nor limits (137D), nor shape (137DE), nor place (138AB), nor motion, [neither?] or revolution or translation (138CDE), nor rest (139B-140B), nor equality, nor inequality of size (140B-D), or of age nor time (140E-141E). But these are only modes of being; so that it is absurd to suppose that the One is [illegible?](142A).

All this leaves us with the impression that a lot of very trivial reasons have been given for holding that some